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Abstract
The lump-sum tax is broadly regarded by standard optimal tax theory as the
only non-distortionary tax instrument; any other tax instrument distorts
relative prices and thus creates a deadweight loss. This paper discusses an
unintended effect of lump-sum taxation that can be considered a distortion
of the time endowment. Whenever this tax exceeds the amount of non-labor
income, it reduces the taxpayer’s ability to freely allocate her time
endowment. As long as the taxpayer assigns a positive value to time
discretion, then the lump-sum tax creates a welfare cost that has not been
identified in the literature. The welfare cost of the lump-sum tax could
plausibly be greater than the traditional measure of deadweight loss of an
equal yield labor income tax, which does not affect time discretion. Since
the lump-sum tax does not unambiguously lead to a greater welfare level,
we can conclude that it is not a proper efficiency standard at low levels of
non-labor income. The same argument can be used to call for caution in the
use of taxes based on the value of assets that are not the source of income
flows, like owner-occupied property taxes and some types of wealth taxes.
At low levels of non-labor income, these tax instruments will also have a
negative effect on time discretion.
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1. Introduction
Lump-sum taxation is widely considered in standard optimal tax theory as the only efficient or
non-distortionary tax instrument. In order to collect a given amount of revenue, any other tax
reduces taxpayer’s welfare more than the lump-sum tax, imposing a deadweight loss to society. 1
This paper argues that when the lump-sum tax exceeds the amount of non-labor income, it becomes
a tax on the time endowment, or a time tax, because the taxpayer is forced to work a certain period
of time without pay. This effect of lump-sum taxation can be interpreted as a loss of taxpayer
discretion over her time endowment, and can even be considered as a form of forced or compulsory
labor. 2
This short paper compares the effects of the lump-sum tax on taxpayer’s time discretion
with the effects of the labor income tax, which does not impose restrictions on the time endowment.
In the presence of time discretion losses, the welfare cost of the lump-sum tax may well exceed
the distortions imposed by other tax instruments. In this context, the choice between lump-sum
and labor income taxation is decided by comparing two types of distortion, and the lump-sum tax
cannot be regarded as proper standard of efficiency.
Time discretion losses can also be caused by taxes on the value of assets that are not the
source of income flows, like owner-occupied property taxes and other forms of wealth taxes. At
low levels of non-labor income, these tax instruments will also have a negative effect on tax

1

For an overview of standard optimal taxation theory see, for instance, Auerbach and Hines (2002).
The Forced Labour Convention of 1930 defines forced or compulsory labor in its Article 2 as “all work or service
which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered
himself voluntarily.” Assuming that tax compliance is enforced and that the taxpayer would not offer herself
voluntarily to work in any job without pay, then the definition describes the case analyzed in this paper. The same
Convention excludes from this definition “any work or service which forms part of the normal civic obligations of
the citizens of a fully self-governing country” as well as other types of work and services; however, we may argue
that labor provided exclusively to pay a tax cannot be considered as a “normal civic obligation.” This Convention
also states in its Article 10 that “[f]orced or compulsory labour exacted as a tax […] shall be progressively
abolished.”
2

1

discretion, becoming a time tax. Moreover, provided that a lower level of non-labor income is
associated with greater discretion losses, time taxes can be expected to be regressive.

3

The net

welfare cost of time discretion losses may help explain the unpopularity of the lump-sum tax and
other taxes with similar effects on the time endowment. 4

2. On the value of time discretion
The lump-sum tax is considered as non-distortionary by definition, because it does not depend on
taxpayer’s behavior. Any given amount of revenue collected through a distortionary tax can also
be collected as a lump-sum tax without distorting relative prices. The lump-sum tax, however, has
an unintended consequence that has not been described in the literature. When it is greater than
non-labor income, the taxpayer is forced to work to pay the tax, and thus her time discretion is
reduced.
The reduction of time discretion is described in Figure 1, where non-labor income is for
simplicity assumed to be zero. Taxpayer’s income 𝑦 increases upward in the vertical axis; leisure
𝜌 increases rightward in the horizontal axis, where 𝜅 represents the time endowment. The initial
budget constraint is the line connecting 𝑎 and 𝜅. A loss of time discretion means that that the
taxpayer is no longer able to freely allocate her time endowment between leisure and labor.

3

The negative welfare effects of time taxes can be especially acute if individuals are already time-poor. Vickery
(1977) defines time-poverty as spending too much time in market work and too little in nonmarket work. A small
but growing body of literature emphasizes the time dimension of wellbeing, and suggests that the income-poor have
limited access to market goods that save household production time (Antonopoulos, Masterson and Zacharias 2012)
and have access to a lower quality of leisure (Merz and Rathjen 2014).
4
Lump-sum tax and wealth taxes have for long been recognized as unpopular in the literature. For instance, the
discontent produced by the implementation of a lump-sum tax in the United Kingdom is considered one of the
factors leading to Margaret Thatcher’s resignation as Prime Minister in 1990 (Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan 2009).
The unpopularity of property taxes and other taxes on wealth has been widely documented. See Pagano and Jacob
(2010).
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Graphically, this loss is shown by a movement of the intercept of the budget constraint with the
horizontal axis to the left of 𝜅, such that 𝜌 = 𝜅 is not feasible anymore. Without non-labor income,
a lump-sum tax 𝑠 reduces time discretion in 𝑠⁄𝑤 units of time, where 𝑤 denotes the wage rate.
Standard optimal taxation theory pays no attention to the effect of lump-sum taxation on
the time endowment, and consequently assumes (implicitly) that the loss of time discretion has no
effect on taxpayer’s welfare. In this framework lump-sum taxation imposes a welfare cost lower
than any other tax instrument. Figure 1 compares the welfare effects of lump-sum and labor income
taxes. The initial equilibrium is at 𝑒0 , where the budget constraint is tangent to the indifference
curve 𝑢0 . A labor income tax rate 𝑡 reduces the wage rate from 𝑤0 to 𝑤1 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑤0 , rotating
the budget constraint over 𝜅 without affecting time discretion. The new optimum under 𝑡 is at 𝑢1 ,
and tax revenue 𝑅 is equal to the vertical difference between the equilibrium point 𝑒1 and the
original budget constraint. The labor income tax is considered inefficient because an equal yield
lump-sum tax 𝑠 = 𝑅 allows the taxpayer to reach a higher level of utility 𝑢2 . Using the expenditure
function 𝐸 (𝑤0 , 𝑢𝑖 ) to represent the minimum expenditure required to reach the utility level 𝑢𝑖 with
the wage rate 𝑤0 , the equivalent variation measure of the deadweight loss of the labor income tax
is 𝐷𝑊𝐿 = 𝐸 (𝑤0 , 𝑢0 ) − 𝐸(𝑤0 , 𝑢1 ) − 𝑅.
The relative benefit of lump-sum taxation has been obtained in this case at the expense of
a loss of time discretion equal to 𝜅 − 𝜋. Standard economic theory is silent about the welfare value
of time discretion, but it implicitly assumes that the value of each unit of time discretion lost is
equal to the wage rate, the opportunity cost of leisure. This implies that the monetary value of 𝜅 −
𝜋 is equal to (𝜅 − 𝜋)𝑤0 = 𝑠, the intended tax burden. The problem with this approach, however,
is that the reduction of income and the reduction of time discretion are different in nature. While
lower income means that some baskets of goods and services are no longer affordable, lower time
3

discretion implies that, in addition, the taxpayer has lost part of her ability to freely allocate her
time endowment. The value of 𝜅 − 𝜋 is simply not meant to be captured by the standard time
allocation model. Indeed, according to the latter the taxpayer could (quite literally) be slaved by
means of the lump-sum tax without increasing the welfare costs above the amount of the tax itself.

Figure 1: Welfare effects of lump-sum and labor income taxes
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The effective value of time discretion depends on the uncertainty faced by the taxpayer
between the implementation of tax policy and the completion of the time allocation decision. To
illustrate this point, consider two alternative tax schedules. Schedule 1 is a 20 percent tax rate on
the wage rate, under which the taxpayer will choose to work six hours per day from Monday to
Friday. Under schedule 2, equivalent to an equal yield lump-sum tax, there is no proportional
reduction in the wage rate, but the first six eight hours of labor supplied on Monday are unpaid.

5

In Figure 1 the equilibrium under schedule 1 would correspond to 𝑒1 , and under schedule 2 to 𝑒2 .

4
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As long as preferences are convex, standard optimal taxation theory predicts that the taxpayer
would invariably be better off under the second alternative. But in order for this conclusion to be
correct, the lump-sum tax must be set before point 𝑒1 has been reached, otherwise there would be
no time left to allocate and 𝑒2 would no longer be feasible. The implementation of the lump-sum
tax must take place before the time allocation decision is made, when the taxpayer is not certain
about how much time she will be able and willing to work during the week. Different possible
scenarios to be realized before or during the week (e.g. sickness, family emergencies, etc.) may
also affect taxpayer’s time discretion and consequently change her optimal labor decision and
utility level. Let each of the 𝑁 possible levels of time discretion be associated with a probability
𝑝𝑛 , where 𝑛 = 1, … , 𝑁. Both the optimal labor decisions as well as the corresponding levels of
utility under the lump-sum tax (𝑢𝑛𝑠 ) and under the labor income tax (𝑢𝑛𝑡 ) can be expected to be
different at each level of time discretion. In this context, it is not necessarily the case that the
𝑠
expected utility under the lump-sum tax, ∑𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑝𝑛 𝑢𝑛 , is greater than the expected utility under the
𝑡
labor income tax, ∑𝑁
𝑛=1 𝑝𝑛 𝑢𝑛 , or that the 𝐷𝑊𝐿 of the labor income tax (as computed by the

standard theory) is greater than its expected utility gains with respect to the lump-sum tax. 6

3. Conclusion
When a lump-sum tax exceeds the amount of non-labor income, time discretion is reduced and the
taxpayer is forced to work without pay. The associated welfare cost is are not accounted for by
standard optimal taxation theory, implying that the deadweight loss of taxes other than lump-sum

A more complete account of the welfare effects of these taxes may include the taxpayer’s attitude toward risk and
the value of eliminating uncertainty with the use of insurance, but they are not considered here because would add
nonessential complications to the main argument presented in this short paper.
6

5

can be overestimated. In particular, labor income taxation allows the taxpayer to enjoy full
discretion over the available tax endowment. If the welfare gains from full time discretion are
equal or greater than the traditional measure of deadweight loss, we can conclude that the labor
income tax is not distortionary. It follows that at low levels of non-labor income the lump-sum tax
may not be a proper standard of efficiency for the design of tax policy reform; and that other taxes
that affect time discretion, like those based on the value of assets that generate no explicit income,
create welfare costs that are underestimated by the standard theory of optimal taxation.
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